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INTRODUCTION 
This Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant 
(hereinafter "Appellant") is intended to reply to new matters 
raised in the Defendants-Respondents' (hereinafter 
"Respondents'") Brief. This Reply Brief is therefore not an 
exhaustive analysis of the Appellant's arguments on appeal; but 
is to be read together with the Appellant's Briefs on file 
herein. Please note that this Reply Brief addresses all four 
cases on appeal herein (Qgden, Lind, Laygo and Springer), whereas 
there are two Appellant Briefs on file herein, one for Qgden and 
Lind prepared by Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General and 
one for Laygo and Springer prepared by Alan S. Bachman, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant (UDOT) relies upon its statement of facts as 
stated in the Appellant's Briefs on file herein. Respondents 
(Landowners) seem to list all components of the record of this 
case for almost half the length of their 69 page "Brief". To 
the extent Respondents' statement of facts conflict with those of 
the Appellant, the Appellant contends that the Respondents 
recitation of facts are in error. Some of those specific errors 
need further explanation as provided hereinbelow. 
1. Appellant objects to the inclusion in Respondents' 
Brief at pages 6 and 36-38 of any matters pertaining to the 
Partington trial which the trial court ruled inadmissible. 
Though Respondents claimed to have proffered the evidence to 
protect their record on appeal, Respondents failed to cross-
appeal in order to raise their contention that such evidence 
should have been considered by the trial court. Therefore, it is 
impermissible for Respondents to have that inadmissible evidence 
in their Brief or to be considered by this Court. 
2. Contrary to the Respondents' assertion on P. 7 of 
their Brief, the reference by Appellant to the lack of the 
Respondents raising the issue of the valuation date in their 
answer, in the immediate occupancy process, or even in the 
pretrial conferences, is of course, relevant to the issue of 
whether Respondents timely raised this issue. 
3. In regard to the particular subject properties, the 
Appellant's Briefs describe the portions of the record and 
transcript which rebut many of the statement made by Respondents 
in their statement of facts. For instance Exhibit "I" and 48 in 
the record demonstrate that the Ogden property was in excess of a 
45% grade. The record referred to in Appellant's Briefs refers 
to the lack of ripeness of the properties for urban development 
and the lack of "follow-through" of the Laygo Respondent-
Defendants to develop their property; all of which need not be 
repeated here in this Reply Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS DID NOT INTRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE UNDER THE FRIBERG CASE FOR 
CHANGING THE VALUATION DATE. 
Despite all the discussion by the Respondents of State 
Com'n v, Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), Respondents failed to 
properly address the key test provided in that case for changing 
the valuation date. The Friberg decision creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the valuation date is the date of service of 
process and, in essence, places the burden of proof on the 
proponent of a changed valuation date. It further states that 
"to rebut that presumption, the unfairness of valuing property as 
of that date must be evident and the difference in value must not 
be insignificant. " Friberg, supra, at 831-832 (emphasis added). 
What is the significant change in value that 
Respondents wish to assert? What significant change in value did 
the trial court find? What was the highest and best use of the 
subject properties in 1977 as required by Utah law in order to 
determine valuation? State Road Commission v. Wood# 22 U.2d 317, 
452 P.2d 872 (1969). Was speculative assembling of the 
properties needed to have an urban use of the properties? Did 
comparable land prices change significantly from 1977 to 1987? 
If so, what was that change? Where are these questions answered 
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in Respondents' Brief? The Respondents have failed to show any 
significant change in value of the subject properties from the 
1987 valuation date to 1977, This is the first step under 
Friberg, supra. Respondents do argue that changes in the 
development market existed between 1977 and 1987. However, 
condemnation valuation is concerned with just compensation and 
the fair market value of the property between a willing buyer and 
willing seller- State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 
(1961). If the landowners can receive a fairly similar price for 
their property in 1977 and 1987, regardless of the development 
costs differential to the purchaser, then their has not been a 
substantial change in value that would cause a change in the 
valuation date under Friberg, supra. In other words, since the 
appraisal evidence, as introduced by the State before the trial 
court, indicates that the 1977 and 1987 fair market values of the 
subject properties are not significantly different, then the 
evidence relied upon by Respondents that it costs more to develop 
in 1987 is inconsequential. The only relevant consequence is if 
willing seller-willing buyer transactions from 1977 to 1987 
indicate that the fair market value of the subject properties has 
significantly declined from 1977 to 1987. 
Therefore, in the absence of any showing of a 
significant change in value (fair market value) between 1977 to 
1987, the trial court had no basis for changing the valuation 
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date from the statutory service of summons date. 
Even if Respondents were to meet the initial test of 
Friberg , supra
 f by showing a significant change ,J n value from 
1977 to 1987, Respondents have failed to she >w that their 
proper ties were j : i pe for t he type of urban development in 19 77 
that they wish to espouse. Respondents have failed to show that 
utilities were reasonably available to the properties in 19 7 7; 
have failed to sh:w that the landow ners pursued development of 
their properties; and have failed to show that the City had any 
adopted law or regulation (which would have been required) which 
precluded development ot the properties because uf a potential 
freeway. (These matters and the appropriate parts of the Record 
are discussed In the Appellant Briefs). Mr. Mclff, before the 
trial court, testified that certain of the properties could be 
assembled together to become developable. That testimony was 
a 11 owed by the t r I a 1 court ii I error a s i 1: I s s pecu 1 a11 ve 
evidence, as discussed in the Appellant Bri efs, State v. Jacobs, 
-' —-•" ' ~ "• 3s/ ? ~ ; • r' -^ . Respondents did not even 
address this issue or : ^  „:i:t- *. . — ; .-.;.-:- i thai .: Br i € ?f. 
Respondents cite cases from other jurisdictions in an • 
effort to bolster support for their argument that the valuation 
date should be changed. None of these cases help the 
Respondents. 
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Respondents rely on Bd. of Cty. Com'rs v. Delaney, Col. 
App., 592 P.2d 1338 (1978). That case, however, discussed an 
irrigation ditch that was replaced and an allowance of repair 
evidence after the date of "take". The Colorado Court of Appeals 
noted that though the cost of repairs was compensable "... it is 
unfair to restrict these costs to any period of time before the 
condemnee received title to the easement." Delaney, supra at 
1340. This case is not relevant to the current fact situation 
and does nothing to show that Respondents should have a 1977 
valuation date. 
Respondents then cite State v. Hollis, 179 P.2d 750 
(Ariz. 1963). Hollis requires that conditions caused by a 
condemnation not be used to reduce value. The Arizona Supreme 
Court in Hollis determined that a lease which would have 
continued in effect if not for the highway project, could still 
be considered to determine value. UDOT would agree with this 
decision and acknowledges that with the use of the 1987 valuation 
date, any specific conditions caused by the condemnation 
activities of UDOT can not be used to lower the value of the 
Respondents' properties. No change in the valuation date is 
needed to allow into evidence, leases or other transactions that 
would have existed but for the condemnation. 
Respondents cite Udovich v. Arizona Board of Regents, 
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9 Ari z. App. 400, 453 P.2d 229 (1969), That case actual ly aids 
the Appellants herein. Uvodich involves a counterclaim (which 
Respondents here failed to fi le) i i i order t : cc: ntend a prev i ous 
taking occurred. Like the Hollis case, the Court held that the 
landowner was still free to show any depreciation in value Que to 
the condemnation. 
Respondents cite City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 748 P. 2d 
7 (Nev. 1987) That case states 1:1 lat :• 
Substantial evidence was presented to establish that 
the 1972 Sparks actions with regard to the tentative 
subdivision plan made it clear that future development 
on such parcels would not be permitted. 
Although the mere planning of a project is generally 
insufficient to constitute a taking, when 
precondemnation activities of the government become 
unreasonable or oppressive in such a manner that 
those activities adversely affect the market value of 
the property, then the property owner is entitled 
to compensation. [City of Sparks, at 8] 
11 :i t he i subject ca. es , t he properti es d :i d not have ' • 
development plans that were denied by UDOT. In fact, no such 
developments were presented, and if they were, it would have been 
the loca 1 goveri iment that wou 3 d ha ve revi ew ed tl le plai is , i :i : t: 
UDOT. In the subject cases as indicated in the Appellant's 
Briefs, the properties were not ripe for development in 1977 or 
the property owners did not actively pursue development As 
discussed on Page 24 of the Laygo/Springer Appellant's Brief, i n 
the only property that was ripe for development in 1977, Laygo, 
the property owners did not even develop the portion of their 
property that was unaffected by the proposed freeway and also did 
not coordinate with UDOT, when such help was offered, to 
delineate the area of their property that UDOT would not be 
interested in, even if funding were later to be available. 
In any event, if the property owners would have so developed in 
1977, U.C.A. §78-34-4 (1987) would have required UDOT to pay for 
such improvements to the subject property made before the service 
of summons. 
Respondents cite Com., Dept. of Transp. v. DiFurio, 555 
A.2d 1379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). However, that case involves a 
condemnor actually sending a condemnation notice letter to the 
landowner as well as visits with the landowner's employees prior 
to formally filing the condemnation action. This is an 
unreasonable intrusion by the government. In the current 
situation, UDOT did nothing more than publicize the potential 
route in order that it could receive the proper public attention 
in order to assure that it is desired and located properly. It 
is not a disputed fact in this case that after funding was 
obtained, UDOT then pursued any notices of intent to condemn and 
the requisite condemnation actions. (Statement of Facts, 
Appellant's Briefs). 
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Respondents cite Lange v. State of Washington, 86 Wash, 
I cfii:i ri4n F.Td ?*? i l^i I MriWMvr-r, 1 I J a t: case requ I i : es I ::he 
State to manifest "its unequivocal intent to appropriate" the 
subject property. The Lange property owners instituted an 
j nverse condem nati on i n iini n ttempt" 111 hav € • thei i" o n\ tPinf I on Il 
precondemnation blight aired before the cour:. The court found, 
howeverf that: 
there was no evidence of interim .nc 
on the part of the State so as to c^  u n 
the property at a depreciated value, 
fLange, at 284] 
In the current case, the State of Utah had not 
manifested its unequivocal intent to appropriate the subject 
j: r oper ti es as I t: cou Id i IC t e i ei l 1 lad doi le s :: • 1 egaJ 1 y wi tl lout 
funding. In fact, under Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 56 7 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1977), UDOT could not have manifested an unequivocal 
...;.:,en: until 1 98:5, when funding was obtained for the subject 
project , This funding is necessary for UDOT to announce "its 
commitment to the project" wii i cl: I c : i ;:i ] d i: ecgi i ii re 1:1 n a n ise :: i: c 
valuation date at that time. [See County of Clark v. Alper, 685 
P. 2d 943, 948 (Nev. 1984) which was relied upon i n City of 
:i n good faith and;, there is no evidence that UDOT did anything to 
delay the condemnation process in order LU ^ake advantage of 
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declining property values. In fact, in 1977, UDOT would have had 
every reason to believe that property values would have increased 
and that it was in UDOT's interest to commence condcsmnation 
proceedings immediately, but for that fact that it would have 
been premature as funding was not available. 
POINT II. 
UTAH LAW CLEARLY ONLY ALLOWS PAYMENT 
OF INTEREST FROM DATE OF OCCUPANCY 
OR ENTRY ON PROPERTY. 
Respondents are in error when they indicate that U.C.A. 
§78-34-9 has not been construed since Friberg, supra. The 
Utah Court of Appeals in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
v. Daskalas, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 70, (Ct. App. 10/11/89), a 1989 
decision, found that the RDA did not occupy the Owners' property 
and that: 
under section 78-34-9, where there is no entry 
or occupation of the property by the condemning 
agency, there is no entitlement to interest. 
The Daskalas case, being a 1989 case, is consistent with the 
following cases cited in Appellant's Briefs: City of So. Ogden 
v. Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980), which held that the City 
did not occupy the property and therefore interest commenced from 
the date the final judgment was entered; State v. Peek, 1 Utah 
2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), wherein even the issuance of a 
service of summons which interfered with the use of the property 
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did not constit"t- possessicr h- t v~ F4--?4-^  »nd t^« »war ziiriu 
interest would ~lv * .- * ,« *„;>- i^ *-e r - act^a. ^session t/ r v 
condemnor; :. State . . neitxiyon 
(1965), whereir the deferral cf a subdivisU 
< onsf i f u f f* - :' ent occupation ui tne -rc r^r*v to commence 
interest. 
Appellants respectfully request your court t. uphold 
I he IOIILJ line nt casRv- in Utah, The Friberj deeinioi , riy 
indicates that the prior cases concerning this interest issue 
should be overturned. The Utah Court c: Appea" ? indicates 
concurrence or. *,., £ ~z.? ~ J :. :.. r .« _ cs&cx^&^ ««.'isi u11,. 
:- supporting their argument zz I\* *e interest commence 
'--?:-—--'- - - " • - >- •'--•- i» „-.- -r held hostage" 
r.ir *:'-: tr.cit wa? : defactc i&k.. ,r >.i, 1977. At the 
same t i m e , Respondents attempt ~ c irgue t.ha' thev had no claim 
tl iat tl: i ey coul :i 1 la e • pre -sented agai nst 1: 1 le Sta te HI 1 1 1 11 | i u I :i i I 
time. (This is discussed further, infra.) Of course, it the 
land was held hostage or i f their was a defacto taking in 1 y /" 7", 
then Respondei I t s c on 3 « I 1 la ' e presei ited ai I i i iv erse condemns* 1 i c in 
claim, at that point in ti me. However, Respondents did not do so, 
and f :)i: g< :) :>d reason,- si nee the land was not held hostage ana 
there was no taking in 1977. 
As discussed in the Appellant's Briefs, the evidence i n 
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the record indicated that the land was not held hostage in 1977. 
Respondents conveniently fail to address a case raised on Page 25 
of the Laygo/Springer Appellant Brief: Sproul Homes of Nevada v. 
State Ex. Rel. Dept. of Highways and County of Clarkf 611 P.2d 
620 (Nev. 1980). Though Respondents cite the City of Sparksf 
supra, Nevada case, that case is not on point since it involved 
the condemnor actually denying development on the owners land. 
It is the Sproul Homes case that is on point. Sproul Homes 
indicates that: 
Beyond the claimed entry for the purpose 
of surveying and appraising, there is no 
allegation of a physical invasion of its 
land. Nor is there any showing of finality 
regarding the state's proposed project. 
Indeed there is no allegation that the 
appellants's property will definitely be 
acquired for highway purposes. Sproul Homes, at 622 
(emphasis added). 
The Nevada Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the 
inverse condemnation complaint. The current situation is similar 
to Sproul Homes and not City of Sparks. In the current 
situation, UDOT had no final plans in 1977 to acquire the subject 
properties. In fact, UDOT did not have funding approved until 
December, 1985. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Exhibit 65, Ogden R-64, 
Lind R-54, Laygo R-48 and Springer R-46). The cases at issue 
herein are therefore similar to Sproul Homes, supra. 
Since the Respondents' properties were not "held 
hostage" by UDOT in 1977 and since UDOT did not occupy or enter 
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the properties at that time, the tri al court erred in ruling that 
interest run from 1977. 
POINT III 
CONTESTING THE CONDEMNOR'S VALUATION 
DATE IS A DEFENSE UNDER U.C.A. §78-34-3 
Respondents claim that the change in valuation date 
. r. - -/ ^  "..-r- . .J defense Ui ider 
Friberg, supra, however, *: \: cie?r *r.e.* the proponent has the 
burden -**' rr:;f * " change the valuation date. It shou] d be 
obvious : cc~ ^ \. ^ . ; ,nc nas i;.e .burden of 
proof and that burden of prr:: \; placed en the Defendant, as is 
c * - : - .-• * ^ i •'.- - ;-- * * * - • 3 1 s e 
their response to the Complaint, Here the Defendants did not 
raise i t in their response to any of the subject Complaints -nd, 
i i i fac I: , in.iL even a I U R ! Line of the hearing on the ir.: *-nat-j 
occupancy issue. Not on ] y was th is defense not properly raised, 
DU S : *' :ice JLL xt n ^^fense tc a taking heiinn .ri 1 1 ^  ] »-M i 
withdrawing the fur. as -,t i uuuediate occupancy, waives the defense 
under "J . '' / •*- "c* : -J • -
Respondv^r. \ ; a i p P a \mw 1111 11 j m 1  11') a rguniPii 1 ( i 
encouraging the withdrawal ol Junda i i urn the Court. The pub! ic 
policy argument i: egard ing th i s issue i s i n favor of UDOT. The 
piibl ic po] icy shou 3 • I fc e that :i f I:l: le c oi ldemi lee bel ieves that I he 
valuation date i s in error, the condemnee should raise that i ssue 
n o i ater than the determination hy uie court that the condemnor 
has made a good faith appraisal of the value of the property, 
submitted it to the court, and therefore entitled to occupancy. 
If the valuation date is in error, discovering it early allows 
the appraisers on both sides to properly appraise the properties 
and hopefully settle the valuation dispute between the parties. 
When the money is withdrawn from the court after the immediate 
occupancy hearing, the condemnor should have the right to rely 
upon U.C.A. §78-34-9 and be assured that the condemnee will not 
later contend that the condemnor already "de facto possessed" the 
property previously and its complaint and appraisal for purposes 
of immediate occupancy are based on an improper taking date. 
Certainly, when a condemnor's complaint alleges the need to take 
property and alleges a certain value, the condemnee's merely 
contesting the value does not inform the condemnor that a claim 
exists for a previous "de facto" taking. 
U.R.C.P 12 (b) characterizes a "defense" as including 
counterclaims. Thus, even if a claim for inverse condemnation or 
a previous "de facto" taking is a counterclaim to a complaint for 
condemnation it nevertheless is a "defense" and it therefore is 
waived if the funds are withdrawn upon immediate occupancy. 
If the condemnee wished to draw upon the deposited funds, but did 
not wish to waive the defense of a previous "defacto taking", 
then the condemnee should have requested a stipulation from the 
condemnor that the order of immediate occupancy include a 
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provision that this defense is not waived. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENTS jy^ B A R R E D
 B Y S T A T U T E Q F 
LIMITATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT FROM RAISING 1977 "DEFACTO TAKING" 
ALMOST TEN (] 0) YEARS LATER 
Respondents do not contend that they raised their 
contention of '""defacto taking" in 19?"", wi th I n the limits of *r.y 
statute of ] im ita ti oi is oi t 1 la t t:l \ey fi J ed a clai m .• :i 
Governmental Immunity Act. On Pages 62-63 of Respondents 
they state that: 
UDOT asserts that it could not have instituted 
condemnation proceedings in 1977 or 1978 since 
the design was not fully completed, nor were funds 
made available. The landowners accept that. 
By the same token, the landowners could not have 
instituted inverse condemnation actions. An action 
by either party would have been premature, even though 
the corridor had been selected and the landowners' 
properties held hostage. Respondents Brief, Pages 
62-63 (emphasis added). 
The flaw in Respondents argument i s obvious. They 
c] a I in thei i: 1 and was hel d hostage i n 1 97 7 ID: : 1 978 Tl ley < :::.] a :ii in 
that U'DO'T and the landowners could i lot hav e instituted an;} action 
j n 1 9 7 7 or 1978, If the 1 and was held hostage in 1977 or 1978 an 
actionable claim arose tl lei i Tl le Respondents d :i d i I :: !:  fi I! = • a 
claim, then because there was not a "defacto taking" in 1 977-1978, 
If such a defacto taki ng d id occu r then, a notice of c] a i m under 
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applicable statute of limitations should have been filed. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Walton v. State Road 
Commission, 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976), held that the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act applied to a case of inverse 
condemnation alleging the taking of access. Respondemts analysis 
of this case is simply incorrect. Respondents claim that Walton: 
does not involve the condemnation of private property. 
... There was not a taking that would have required the 
filing of eminent domain proceedings. An inverse 
condemnation action would have been the only manner in 
which the matter could have been brought before the 
court. Respondents' Brief, Pages 65-66. 
Obviously, if an inverse condemnation claim is actionable, then 
the government should have been able to file a condemnation 
claim up front. In fact, an inverse condemnation claim is based 
upon the government's failure to file a condemnation action when 
it should have. See State v. Hollis, supra, at 751, wherein the 
Arizona Supreme Court states that: 
The remainder of the Complaint alleges that 
the State, without instituting condemnation 
proceedings, appropriated the plaintiffs' 
access right to their property and otherwise damaged 
the property by the acts of its agent. The 
complaint therefore states a cause of action 
on the theory of inverse eminent domain. 
Hollis, also necessarily concluded that a condemnation action can 
be maintained for the taking of a property owner's access rights. 
Respondents cite no law that prohibits the government from filing 
a condemnation case for the taking of access. There is no reason 
to believe that the Walton court would not have applied the same 
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analysis to a "defacto taking" such as the one Respondents 
« i"MItend herein. 
Respondents c11 ^  d N*jva 111 .'
 (i s t „ C i ty ol Sparks v . 
Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 (1987 i In an attempt to bolster their 
ijHiuinent , H O W P V H T , Sparks does not discuss any governmental 
immunity act and does not discuss Utah's statute \\i JmuLdi i nit. 
In reading the Sparks case, it is clear that; a governmental 
immunity uct J,L in I iJ i snte r.ed ' "faMiitP t 1 n in 11 at i r n defense 
is discussed only after it is concluded that the case does not 
f v. 1' r- ,-jn inverse condemnation claim without any explanation 
that would aid as tc wnemer JL U appii i-di ie u ilif i i MJ I inn 
subject case here. Appellants respectfully request that your 
i nujt M l low the log ir a rpasonino ol the Utah r nurt in Walton 
and not the uncertain reasoning of the Nevada court m Sparks, 
Respondents are a Is: incorrect about the 
inapp] i cabili ': * - •- ' * .-r^-r-r/ai 
immunity act applying •• . :* Respondents ^. . . ^ c. ; »+• 
their land was ne^d "hostage" in 1977-78, the filing of a notice 
o;t claim, would have served L\\H pui pose of ci lei Liny !ln;-> Stat:*-1 *f 
Utah to the concerns of the landowners. The government, ni| in 
receiving the noti.rK \'f I aim, could have instituted condemnation 
proceedings * £ certain conditions were met; aoturminea LIIGII 'tnoie 
w a s no actionable governmental intrusion; -.r ceased any 
actionable intrusive activities. Of course, the land was not 
held "hostage" then and no notice of claim was filed. 
Respondents then assert that Salt Lake v. Ramoselli# 
567 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1977) aids their cause. Ramoselli 
indicates that the State can not condemn without funding approved 
for the subject project. In this case, as discussed previously, 
funding was not approved antil December, 1985. What the Supreme 
Court indicated in Ramoselli that UDOT can not do directly (file 
a condemnation action prior to funding), it should not be able to 
do indirectly (have a valuation date prior to the funding date). 
If precondemnation activities of UDOT were (and they were not in 
this case) holding the landowners' properties hostage prior to 
UDOT having funding for the subject project in 1985, the 
landowners could have successfully enjoined such actions as being 
in violation of the Ramoselli case. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not intended to be a "findings" appeal, but 
rather an interlocutory appeal requested for the purpose of 
guiding the trial court in the application of law to the facts of 
this case. The law simply does not allow for the valuation date 
to be changed from 1987 to 1977 based upon the evidence in the 
record. Respondents did not timely raise the valuation date 
issue, both under the Governmental Immunity Act and any 
applicable Utah statute of limitations. Respondents 
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result,, waived the consideration of the defense claim of a 
He; ,if* • 1: ak :i n j i n 19" "7 . The undisputed evidence indicates that 
UDOT could not, and did not, unegu ivocal ly commi t to condemnation 
of the subject properties until no earlier than December, 1985, 
w t in e i 'i J* 1 J i i.d i ng w a s c ! 1: 1: a i n ed. T ii € • 1 a w i s a 1 s c c 1 e < i i f h a 1 s ii i t. :: ' e UDOT 
did not occupy or enter the subject properties in 197 ', that 
interest can not commence back then. 
E vei i 1 f Respondents did proper] y i: a 1 se the 
date issue and could show that the properties were subjected to 
u n reasonab] e i ntrusions i n 197 7 , Respondents have fa IJ ed to 
present any credible evidence before the trial court that their 
was a significant change in fair market value of the subject 
proper ti es fr Dm 1 97 7 !:c 11! 9 8 7 :i i I o r • ier 1: ::> i i r ? ol ::e a chai ige :i n 
valuation date under Friberg, supra. 
Based upon the foregoi ng, the dates of valuati on i n 
these subject ca ses shou 1 d be 11: ie servi ce :: f summons a J i u in u=;i; e s t 
should commence to run from, and after the dates the trial court 
granted the applicable order of Immediate Occupancy, 
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